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The European single market in electricity has been promoted vigorously by the European 
Commission since 1996. We discuss how national electricity markets and cross border 
electricity markets have been reshaped by the process. We examine the Commission’s own 
work on evaluating the benefits of the single market. We look at the wider evidence of impact 
on prices, security of supply, the environment and on innovation. We conclude that the 
institutional changes are extensive and there has been significant market harmonisation and 
integration. However, the measured benefits are difficult to identify, but likely to be small. This 
is partly because over the same period there has been a large rise in subsidised renewable 
generation driven by the decarbonisation agenda. 
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1. Background to the Single Market in Electricity 
As early as 1988 the European Commission2 began thinking about how the Single European 
Act of 1986, which paved the way for the European Single Market, might be applied in the 
energy sector, specifically to electricity and gas supply. This began a long process of opening 
national wholesale and retail electricity and gas markets to trade and competition across the 
single market area. 
What has happened in the Europe to national electricity markets in Europe since then is a 
fascinating economic story and is a textbook case study in how the process of European market 
integration has worked and the difficulties to be overcome in achieving such integration. 
Globally electricity is not a heavily traded good. Of all gross electricity production only around 
3% was exported across national borders in 2015 and most of this trade occurred in Europe 
(with a significant share of the rest being between the US and Canada)3. This makes electricity 
much less heavily traded than oil, gas and coal. 
                                                 
1 The author wishes to thank the participants at the joint Review of Industrial Organization and CEPR 
conference ‘Celebrating 25 Years of the EU Single Market’ conference held at the Cambridge Judge Business 
School in April 2018 for their feedback on an earlier presentation of this paper. He also wishes to thank an 
anonymous referee for helpful comments. All errors are his own. 
2 See European Commission (1988). 
3 In 2015, 58% of global exports of electricity occurred from OECD Europe and 9% of global exports were 
from Canada to the US (see IEA (2017, p.II.5)). 
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While electricity trading across European borders is a key part of the single market in electricity 
story it is by no means all of it. National electricity systems and policies have been significantly 
altered by the requirements of the single market and indeed these effects have been at least as 
important as what has happened to cross-border trading of wholesale electricity. Here the 
requirement for national policies to adhere to the requirements of European directives have 
affected the organization of the sector and its regulation. Combined with other EU energy 
policies towards carbon trading (which covers the electricity sector); 2020 renewable 
electricity and energy targets; energy security and energy efficiency; national electricity sectors 
have gone through profound changes. 
The primary legislative means by which the EU has brought about this change is through three 
single electricity market directives in 1996 (96/92/EC), 2003 (03/54/EC) and 2009 (09/72/EC). 
These directives have required member states (and Norway as a non-EU member of the single 
electricity market4) to meet certain requirements in their national legislation, as well as setting 
out pan-European policy. The electricity sector comprises of a number of elements each of 
which has been affected by the directives: generation (power plants), transmission (high 
voltage wires), distribution (lower voltage wires); retail suppliers (who bill final customers); 
customers (who might choose suppliers); the degree of unbundling (both horizontal and vertical 
between generation, transmission, distribution, retail); and cross-border trading over 
interconnectors.5 
Prior to the 1996 directive a few single market countries, such as Norway, Sweden and the UK 
had liberalized their electricity sectors to create wholesale power markets and introduce 
competition in the early 1990s. However, across most of the EU, generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail supply were mostly in the hands of incumbent domestic monopolists 
(such as EdF in France, or ENEL in Italy). Horizontal bundling was the norm with no 
competition in each segment of the industry. Often incumbent monopolists ranged across 
generation, transmission, distribution and retail, exhibiting large degrees of vertical bundling 
of assets. Customers of these monopolists had no choice of supplier, no matter how large the 
customers were. Cross border trade was controlled by bilateral monopolists on either side of 
the border, who were able to set cross-border tariffs and allocate cross-border transfer capacity. 
The only example of cross-border trading on a market basis was between Norway, Sweden and 
later Finland, within a market arrangement called NordPool. 
The directives changed this radically by establishing a process of opening-up of the market to 
competition across the EU. Essentially this process forced all member countries both to follow 
the example of the early market reforming states nationally and to promote a genuine cross-
border market.  
The 1996 directive envisaged that by end of 1999 all generation would be either subject to free 
entry into a wholesale market arrangement or competitively procured by a single buyer under 
a tendering procedure; all access to the transmission and distribution system would be subject 
to negotiated or regulated third party (RTP) access on common terms, in the absence of a single 
buyer; retail suppliers could freely compete with one another to acquire customers; the largest 
customers representing about 1/3 of demand could choose their retail supplier; all remaining 
vertically bundled transmission and distribution businesses would have to produce separate 
                                                 
4 Switzerland is physically interconnected with the single market but it is not a full member of the single market 
in electricity. 
5 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) for a longer discussion. 
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accounts (so called ‘accounting unbundling’); and all cross border trade would be subject to at 
least negotiated third party access. The 1996 directive offered a number of options which 
countries could take (like the choice of negotiated or regulated third party access) as a way of 
persuading initially reluctant reformers (such as France) to begin their reform process. 
Individual EU member states (MSs) were free to adopt the more competitive arrangements 
more quickly and indeed to go further than the minimum required by the directive (such as 
giving all customers free choice of retail supplier which happened in the UK in 1999). 
The 2003 directive (03/54/EC) envisaged that by the end of 20076: all generation would be 
subject to free entry into a wholesale market arrangement; all access to the transmission and 
distribution system would be subject to regulated third party access on common terms; retail 
suppliers could freely compete with one another to acquire customers; all customers, including 
households of any size, could choose their retail supplier; all remaining vertically bundled 
transmission and distribution businesses would have to held in legally separate business units 
(legal unbundling); and all cross border trade would be subject to regulated third party access. 
The 2003 directive extended the scope of wholesale and retail competition and was a way of 
forcing slowly reforming MSs to go further in an environment where leading countries were 
already completing their own internal market in electricity (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). The 
2003 directive also required MSs to have a national electricity regulator with a degree of 
independence from government responsible for regulating the charges of the incumbent 
transmission and distribution companies and ensuring non-discriminatory network access. 
A very visible effect of the directives (and of the Single Market more generally) was that it 
unleashed a wave of mergers across the EU of electricity and gas companies. EdF, RWe, E.ON, 
Iberdrola, ENEL and Vattenfall expanded substantially outside their home markets in both 
generation and retail. In the UK, for instance, EdF, RWe and E.ON became the three largest 
generators and three of the largest retailers. By the mid-2000s many of the smaller European 
generators and retailers had been taken over by major pan-European companies. 
What followed the coming into force of the 2003 directive was a growing realization that while 
a lot of progress had been made in reforming national electricity markets and the 
internationalization of ownership, very little progress had been made in creating a genuine 
single market in electricity with wholesale markets extending across borders. In 2004, the 
European Commission began to support what became known as the ‘target model’7 which 
envisaged the gradual integration of national electricity markets, around a system of market 
coupling, whereby national markets would be merged or coordinated. Prior to market coupling 
a trader wishing to sell electricity between two markets would need to buy the power in one 
market, sell the power in another and separately procure the transfer capacity on the 
interconnector between them. This was a costly and inaccurate process, especially if trading 
periods were not coordinated across the three transactions. Under market coupling, available 
transfer capacity is declared to the markets and power can be bought and sold between the two 
markets subject to one market clearing algorithm. If there is enough transfer capacity the prices 
in the two markets will be the same, if there is a transmission capacity constraint power should 
be seen to flow from the low price market to high price one. The period since 2004 has seen a 
large increase in the degree of coordination between day-ahead wholesale markets as a result 
of the extension of individual markets and the coupling between markets. 
                                                 
6 Except for certain MSs granted limited time extensions to comply with the directive. 
7 See Moffatt Associates (2007) and European Commission (2011). 
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Progress on market design has been assisted by pan-European competition policy in electricity. 
MSs have traditionally been somewhat reluctant to increase imports of electricity to protect 
their domestic generators (from increased competition) and partly for reasons of energy 
security (by making it easier for national system operators to manage their system by simply 
adjusting national supply and demand). This has led to allegations that transfer capacity was 
not being allocated efficiently at the border and that available capacity was not being offered 
to the market. 
In response to this and other concerns about the slow progress in the creation of single market, 
the European Commission began a major energy sector competition inquiry in 2005. The 
inquiry reported in 2007 (European Commission, 2007) and spurred competition enforcement 
action and the third electricity single market directive in 2009. This directive significantly 
strengthened the unbundling requirements on transmission businesses and created a preferred 
model for transmission of ownership unbundling. It also established a pan-European regulatory 
agency for electricity and gas (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators - ACER)8. 
This agency was charged with dispute regulation between national regulators and the 
monitoring of cross-border competition. Since then there has been a significant move towards 
unbundling of German transmission assets, which has helped to promote cross-border trading 
and efficient allocation of transmission capacity in central Europe (discussed in the next 
section). 
Two other sets of policies also impact the single electricity market.  
Several incidents have highlighted the vulnerability of interconnected national electricity 
markets. In 2003, a series of blackouts across the globe drew attention to the need for increased 
coordination between system operators across different interconnected systems. As a result, 
the European Commission now lists as one of its policies for energy security an increase in 
national electricity interconnection from its current average level of 8% of peak capacity to 
15% by 2030 (having had a target of 10% by 2020).9 To promote this policy the Commission 
has been actively promoting projects of common interest (PCIs) which increase transmission 
capacity between nations, in particular with respect to Baltic (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) 
and Iberic (Spain – and by implication Portugal – and France) isolation.10 In some areas, such 
as across the North Sea, there has been a significant increase in transmission capacity. 
Increased interconnection for security reasons promotes wholesale market integration and 
expansion. 
The renewables and decarbonisation agenda are having a significant impact on the electricity 
industry. The 2001 renewable electricity directive (2001/77/EC) and the 2009 renewable 
energy directive (2009/28/EC) have together massively increased the requirement for 
electricity generation to come from renewable electricity sources such as bio-energy, wind and 
solar. These have been heavily subsidized by national governments and have significantly 
reduced the amount of generation being competitively added on the basis of predicted future 
wholesale market prices. Meanwhile the introduction of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) in 2005, which included electricity within a traded carbon allowance system, has 
                                                 
8 See www.acer.europa.eu 
9 See European Commission (2014b, p.10). 
10 See European Commission (2014b, p.24). 
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seen significant incentives at different times to favour gas fired power generation over coal 
fired power generation (and sometimes vice versa)11. 
The overall context for current energy and climate policy to 2020 is the 20-20-20 targets for 
2020 agreed in 2007, enacted in 2009. These are a 20% reduction in CO2e (on 1990 levels); 
20% of gross final energy consumption to come from renewable energy12; and a 20% increase 
in energy efficiency (energy demand relative to levels projected around 2005). The European 
Union have recently agreed to set a 40-27-30 set of targets for 2030 (more precisely: -40% 
GHG emissions, >27% renewable energy and >30% increase in energy efficiency), with 
primacy given to the 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.13 The EU wide targets for 
CO2e reduction and renewables share are disaggregated into national level targets (some 
greater or less than the aggregate target), whereas all member states are expected to meet the 
energy efficiency target. 
As noted in Pollitt (2009), much of the initial implementation of these policies to meet energy 
and climate targets across the EU was ‘patchy’ with big differences between the enthusiastic 
reformers and lagging states. 
A 4th Energy Package was tabled by the European Commission on 30th November 2016 entitled 
‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’. These measures are intended to lead to a new Electricity 
Directive and include three main goals: ‘Putting energy efficiency first; Achieving global 
leadership in Renewable energies; and Providing a fair deal for consumers.’14 
 
2. The evolution of the Single Market in Electricity 
 
The individual member states of the EU single market have very different national electricity 
resources. Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain have large national markets, significantly 
larger than other countries. France is dominated by nuclear, Germany has a significant share 
of coal, while the UK, Spain and Italy have relatively more gas in their electricity mix. Norway 
has significant hydro capacity. Many other national markets are small but located close to much 
larger countries.15 This immediately suggests that there must be significant room for trading to 
exploit relative price differentials on the different marginal generation technology, non-
coincident peaks in demand and the sharing of reserve capacity.  
 
In addition to the underlying differences in technology and demand characteristics, the move 
to a single market can increase the number of firms effectively competing in wholesale and 
retail markets, either by simply increasing the size of the market (via coupling national 
electricity markets) or by encouraging cross-entry between former monopoly incumbents in 
neighbouring member states. The electricity directives encouraged this by removing barriers 
to entry into national electricity markets. This increased the number of effective competitors 
and reduced the effective market share of incumbent firms. A significant part of this process 
was the harmonisation of the rules for new connection, third party access to transmission and 
                                                 
11 See Koenig (2011). 
12 European Commission (2006) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52006DC0545&from=EN and Directive 2012/27/EU http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0001:0056:en:PDF 
13 For a review of progress see European Commission (2017a). 
14 See https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-consumer-centred-clean-energy-
transition Accessed 24 March 2018. 
15 See IEA (2017). 
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distribution system and retailing electricity to final consumers. The rise of independent energy 
regulators tasked with promoting domestic electricity market competition and with incentive 
regulation of electricity networks facilitated increasing competition in line with the intention 
of the directives. A deep process of national network code harmonisation is currently underway 
with oversight from ACER (and largely due for completion by 2019).16 
 
The process of opening up national electricity markets has been a gradual one. Globally many 
lessons have been learned along the way (see Joskow, 2008, for a review of international 
experience). In the EU, as elsewhere, continuing vertical integration between transmission, 
distribution and generation resulted in difficulties in new generators getting access to networks 
and hence the ability to supply their customers (this was a particular issue for new entrant 
Enron in France and Germany in the early days of reform).17 Within electricity wholesale 
markets there were examples of tacit collusion between generators (e.g. within the UK, where 
the regulator had impose a price cap on the two leading generators in 1996).18 There were 
problems with access to congested transmission links, with incumbent generators hoarding 
their historic access rights in order to limit cross-border trading (something which explained 
initially low or non-economic cross-border power flows). This inefficient utilisation of cross-
border transmission links was a major driver behind the competition enquiry into the operation 
of the wholesale electricity and gas markets launched by the European Commission in 2005.  
 
The energy sector inquiry published its final report in January 200719. It found that there was: 
‘too much market concentration in most national markets; a lack of liquidity, preventing 
successful new entry; too little integration between Member States’ markets; an absence of 
transparently available market information, leading to distrust in the pricing mechanisms; an 
inadequate current level of unbundling between network and supply interests which has 
negative repercussions on market functioning and investment incentives; customers being tied 
to suppliers through long-term downstream contracts; current balancing markets and small 
balancing zones which favour incumbents’.20 The inquiry led to a number of recommendations 
including competition enforcement action where necessary, unbundling of transmission 
network ownership from generation, increased powers for regulators and increased cross-
border regulatory coordination, improved market transparency, removal of regulated retail 
tariffs, and competitive allocation of cross-border interconnector capacity.21 The Commission 
pursued a case against the integrated German incumbent E.ON which eventually resulted in a 
voluntary settlement which involved E.ON divesting some generation plant in Germany and 
putting its transmission business up for sale in 2008.22 The Energy Inquiry was a significant 
driver behind the ‘Third Energy Package’, which gave rise to the 3rd Single Electricity Market 
directive in 2009 and the creation of the pan-European regulatory agency (ACER). 
Transparency has been increased by the 2011 REMIT Regulation (No.1227/2011), which 
covers oversight of interconnectors and abuse of markets, and is overseen by ACER.23 
                                                 
16 See Dale (2017). 
17 See Bergman et al. (1999). 
18 See Newbery (2005). 
19 See European Commission (2007),  
20 See European Commission website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/2005_inquiry/index_en.html 
Accessed 16 March 2018. 
21 See European Commission (2007, pp.9-15). 
22 See Chauve et al. (2009). 
23 See ACER (2016) for example. 
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However national markets have been increasingly integrated. In 1976 only around 6% of 
electricity produced in the ENTSO-E area was traded across national borders. In 2015 nearly 
14% of electricity produced in the ENTSO-E area was traded across national borders. This 
figure was itself significantly higher than in 1996.24 
 
In 2016 ACER25 reported that across the European Union that 86% of available commercial 
interconnector capacity was being allocated in the ‘right’ (from low to high price areas) 
direction via the coupled day ahead markets. However, it also estimated that there were still 
unrealised gains of €203m per year if market coupling extended to remaining borders. 
However, for a selection of borders that ACER looked at in more detail only 50% of intraday 
capacity was being allocated in the ‘right’ direction and 19% of balancing action flows were 
in the ‘right’ direction. 
 
3. The European Commission’s Assessment of the Single Market in Electricity 
 
1999 and 2003 and 2009 are the key dates of implementation of the variation stages of the 
single electricity market so far. The Commission has undertaken various Benchmarking and 
State of the Market Reports.26 These reports mostly focus on the implementation of various 
parts of the directives (such as on unbundling rules). However, there is remarkably little serious 
analysis by the Commission (or indeed cited by the Commission) on the effects of the single 
market in electricity project relative to what might have happened in the absence of its 
interventions. 
 
European Commission (2014a) finds that wholesale electricity prices fell 35% between 2008 
and 2012. However, households and industrial customers did not see lower bills because over 
this period network charges went up 18.5% and 30% for households and industry respectively, 
while taxes and levies rose by 36% and 127% for households and industry respectively. This 
highlights the important issue that over the period there has been a significant imposed cost of 
renewables and climate policy, which obscures any impact of the single market on underlying 
costs and margins. It also shows the importance of network charges for final bills, especially 
for households. These remain regulated by national regulators and the determination of how 
generous these are remains outside the remit of the European Commission. A further 
observation is that wholesale prices remain subject to commodity price fluctuations for both 
gas and coal. 2008-2012 is a period of falling commodity prices (by contrast 2004-2008 is a 
period of significantly increased commodity prices). Figure 1 shows the underlying rise in 
nominal commodity prices for coal and gas in Europe over the period we are considering, and 
the large fluctuations it has been subject to. 
 
                                                 
24 Sources: ENTSO-E (2011) and ENTSO-E (2017b).  
25 ACER/CEER (2017). 
26 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) and Pollitt (2009) for discussions of early versions of these reports. See 
European Commission (2017b) for an example of current reporting. 
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Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017. 
 
 
Getting a sense of the impact of the single market on aggregate prices and welfare since 1999 
is difficult. Copenhagen Economics (2005) provided an early assessment for the Commission 
of the possible effects of market opening in electricity using a general equilibrium model using 
data from 1990-2003. They do this in stages, by measuring market opening at the national level, 
then econometrically estimating the effects of market opening on individual countries 
electricity sector performance, and finally estimate the overall impact on the economy using 
their general equilibrium model of the European economy. They did find significant impacts 
from market opening on national productivity and estimated the long-run impact in electricity 
could be as high as 7-8% (and even higher % price reductions). 
 
More recently, working for the Commission, the impacts of the single market have been 
analysed by Booz & Company (2013). They identify the period before 2004 as one of mainly 
national based reforms. From 2004, there was an increasing trend towards coupling national 
markets at the wholesale level (the ‘target model’). This study has been subsequently published 
as Newbery et al. (2016). Market coupling would appear to have significant and dramatic 
benefits. Moss (2009) examines the coupling of the power flows between the Netherlands and 
France before and after the coupling of the APX and PowerNext power exchanges in November 
2006. In 2005/6 prices were more than €10 different 39% of the time, in 2007/8 this had fallen 
to 14% of the time, by contrast prices were less than €1 different 10% of the time in 2005/6 but 
72% of the time in 2007/8. 
Booz & Company (2013)27 suggest that the total value of electricity trading is roughly €16bn 
p.a. (308 TWh @ €50/MWh) and that the value of full market coupling is around one quarter 
of this (based on the degree of price convergence seen at borders) or €4bn p.a. They find that 
if market coupling covers 58-66% of the market the current benefits are €2.5bn p.a. A further 
€1.5bn p.a. of benefits is therefore possible if all interconnectors within the EU are coupled. 
But the current market coupling only covers short term day ahead trading.  Extending market 
coupling of interconnectors to cover shorter term intra-day trading of electricity, balancing 
services and reserve capacity and financial transmission rights would produce further gains 
beyond the day ahead market. Booz & Company (2013) suggest large additional gains from 
                                                 
27 See https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20130902_energy_integration_benefits.pdf 
Accessed 24 March 2018. 
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these measures under different scenarios of renewable penetration. However, these are yet to 
be realized. 
Overall the impression one gets from the Commission’s own evidence is that of limited gains 
so far in terms of proven price and productivity effects, coupled with an emphasis on the 
potential for much larger future gains. In the next section, we look at some of the wider 
academic evidence on the impact of the single market in electricity project. 
4. Assessing the impact of the Single Market in Electricity 
 
The measurement of the overall impact of the single electricity market, on prices, costs and 
wider GDP is difficult as the attempts by the Commission to study this illustrate. 
 
We can start by thinking about how the single market is supposed to have an effect, through 
bringing about pro-competitive structural change and the quality of sector regulation, before 
looking at the measured economic impact. 
 
Pro-competitive structural change and quality of sector regulation 
 
The OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) index provides a relative measure of the degree 
of deregulation of a nation’s electricity sector28. The index has a range of 0 to 6, where 0 is 
most liberalised and 6 would be an unreformed integrated government monopoly. This index 
puts one quarter weight on entry regulation, the percentage of public ownership, the degree of 
vertical separation and the market share of the largest company in the sector. Under a 
combination of free entry regulation, regulated third party access (TPA), a liberalised 
wholesale power market and no minimum threshold on the size at which a customer can chose 
supplier, would give the lowest possible liberalisation score of zero. Under vertical integration, 
ownership separation gives the lowest possible liberalisation score of 0 (legal separation scores 
3). Under market structure, a combined generation/import and supply share of less than 50% 
for the largest firm, gives a score of zero. If 100% of the shares in the firms across 
generation/import, transmission, distribution and supply were government owned this would 
score 6. The implementation of the single electricity market directives should result in a zero 
score for entry regulation and market share of largest firm in the sector and a maximum of 3 
for vertical integration and less than 6 (due to some entry) for public ownership. Thus should 
imply that the maximum EU member state score under the PMR is 2.3. Indeed between 2008 
and 2013 the PMR score for EU electricity did improve from 2.4 to 2.1, relative to 2.6 to 2.4 
for the OECD29.  
 
Since 1999, there has been a significant increase in generation competition within MSs. The 
Czech Republic, France, Greece, Luxembourg have all increased their number of main 
generators (with 5% of national production) in 2015 from 1 in 2003. Effective competition has 
also significantly increased in Germany.30 Estonia, France, Croatia, Latvia, Portugal have 
increased their number of main (with 5% of national consumption) retailers in 2015 from 1 in 
2003.31 
                                                 
28 Koske et al. (2015, p.63). 
29 Koske et al. (2015, p.63). 
30 See Eurostat data on number of main generating companies at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/7/7a/Number_of_main_electricity_generating_companies-T2.png 
31
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/5/57/Number_of_main_electricity_retailers-T6.png 
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A developing theme of the single market in electricity project has been the need to improve the 
quality of both national and EU level regulation of the sector. This is discussed in Green et al. 
(2009). They point out the importance of improving the form, process and outcomes of energy 
sector regulation.  
 
The form of regulation can be measured on the basis of the strength of the regulator in terms 
their separation from government and their ability to regulate the industry. Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2005) scored ex ante regulation, no ministerial involvement in decision making, network 
access conditions set by the regulator (rather than elsewhere), dispute settlement by the 
regulator and strong information acquisition powers at 5 out 5, for regulatory strength. Larsen 
et al. (2005) focused on the scope of the regulatory functions, finding that 15 European 
regulators had from 1 to 7 different competencies. 
 
The process of regulation focusses on the degree of transparency exhibited by the regulator, 
the amount of stakeholder engagement, the procedural efficiency in coming to regulatory 
decisions and quality of the underlying techniques utilised in carrying out their functions. 
Regulators which are more transparent in their decision making, deliver their decisions in a 
timely way, undertake good levels of stakeholder engagement and use best practice techniques 
of regulation are thought to have better processes.32  
 
The outcomes of regulation are more difficult to measure. This is because regulators do operate 
under different rules and objectives. Process in a democracy matters for its own sake – 
stakeholders do like and need to be consulted. Regulatory decisions can only be evaluated ex 
post and it is not clear how to do this, given that there is very unlikely to be an unbiased, 
statistically identifiable measure of impact. Nillesen and Pollitt (2007) discuss a case study of 
the miscalculation of price controls in the Netherlands and how much this cost Dutch 
customers. It is possible to try and benchmark regulator costs across countries, but this would 
need to be corrected for number of regulatory functions and economies of scale in regulation 
(see Domah and Pollitt, 2002). 
 
The single electricity market project has undoubtedly spread good practice in both the form, 
process and outcomes of regulation (especially initially, as noted by Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). 
The directives have promoted independent sector regulation of electricity (notable forcing 
Germany to have an electricity regulator, when it initially did not). CEER (the industry 
association of regulators) and ACER have been fora for the spread of good regulatory practice 
and many European countries have much better regulators then they would otherwise have had. 
 
The measured economic impact of the single electricity market 
 
Here we update our earlier work (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Pollitt, 2009) in order to examine 
economic impact under a number of different headings: prices, costs, return on capital and fuel 
poverty; quality of service; impact on the environment (via renewables and decarbonisation); 
and the impact on innovation. The first three can be summarized as: affordability, security of 
supply and the environment (the so called ‘energy trilemma’).  The fourth is about dynamic 
efficiency. We conclude this section by revisiting overall assessments.  
 
                                                 
32 See, for example, Brophy Haney and Pollitt (2013) who compare regulators on the quality of the 
benchmarking techniques they use to measure the efficiency of their regulated transmission companies. 
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Prices, costs, rate of return on capital and fuel poverty 
 
Has the single market reduced average prices (relative to business as usual) and price dispersion 
as we would expect from theory, especially in the wholesale power market? 
 
Measuring the average price effect is hard because of the confounding impact of fossil fuel 
price fluctuations, renewables support policy and network expenditure. There is some limited 
evidence of liberalization reducing household electricity prices looking at data for 23 EU 
countries from 2000-14 (da Silva et al., 2017). This is in line with earlier studies that suggest 
limited price effects due to the introduction of a wholesale power market and unbundling of 
transmission and generation. 
 
There is rather more recent support for price convergence. The EU does measure the relative 
standard deviation of retail electricity prices in the EU member states. Industrial prices do show 
a degree of convergence over the period 2014-2017 (see European Commission, 2017, p.29). 
Market coupling does appear to be associated with strong price correlations. Ouraichi and 
Spataru (2015) find high price correlations between national markets within 4 regional markets 
(CWE, CEE, MIBEL and NordPool)33 AND high price correlation between countries in each 
of two different regional markets. They conclude that the flow-based market coupling policy 
of the EU has had promising if incomplete results, for instance CWE (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) countries only exhibit 74% correlation within the 
region. Using a different measure (fractional cointegration analysis) of price convergence, de 
Menezes and Houllier (2016) also find evidence of price convergence between European 
electricity markets. 
 
We would expect that prices and costs would move in parallel: falls in prices likely imply falls 
in costs. We can observe prices, but costs are rather more difficult to observe. They can only 
be observed indirectly, if we look at returns on equity as well as prices. If returns stay constant 
costs and prices move together, if returns fall but prices stay the same then costs must be rising 
– though the price (i.e. cost) of capital may be falling - and vice versa. We would expect 
liberalization to reduce overall returns to capital in the electricity sector, but it is possible the 
profit maximizing firms are good at price discriminating across their customer base, or at 
bargaining with their suppliers. 
 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) produced some early evidence of falling returns in the electricity 
sector following liberalization, as well as falling costs. More recent studies looking at returns 
find mixed evidence of any change to underlying profitability. 
 
Mergers in the electricity sector have created more value for European acquirers over the period 
1998-2013 (Kishimoto et al., 2017). This would seem to indicate that the benefits of the single 
market are being brought about by the takeover of inefficient domestic firms by more efficient 
ones, and is consistent with the ability of mergers to create larger firms with greater economies 
of scale and scope. OECD (2016, chapter 5) shows a declining trend in clean energy returns on 
equity (relative to the cost of equity) in Europe over the period 2004-2015, this might be 
indicative of tougher conditions for renewables procurement (though this is not necessarily 
directly related to liberalization). Tulloch et al. (2018) find declining returns on European 
electricity and gas utilities over the period 1996-2013, with a larger effect of the 2003 
                                                 
33 CWE = Central West Europe; CEE = Central and Eastern Europe; MIBEL = Iberia; and NordPool = Nordic 
countries. 
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directives. They suggest that their results are consistent with evidence that the markets are 
becoming more competitive, albeit with some offsetting increase in risk. CEER (2017) find 
continuing wide variation in the target rates of return (WACC) used in electricity distribution 
and transmission, indicating a lack of standardization of network investment risks across 
Europe. 
 
Since the beginning of the reform period fuel poverty has emerged as a big issue in some EU 
countries, notably the UK. Conventionally defined as those spending 10% or more of their 
household expenditure on electricity and gas it has become a focus of government policy on 
energy pricing. There is little evidence that this has systematically increased since 1996, but 
there is no doubt that energy remains a significant expenditure item for many households across 
the EU (see Wand, 2013)34.  
 
Quality of service 
 
The willingness to pay for continuity of service in electricity is very high: typically, of the 
order of 50-100 times more than the value of the retailed price of electricity.35 This suggests 
that small improvements in quality of service can be very valuable. For instance, an 
improvement of just half an hour in customer minutes could be worth of the order of 0.5% of 
the total value of electricity sold in the year36. Most interruptions to customer supply are local 
due to problems with local substations. Regulators are also concerned about transmission 
system availability as this may be an indication of more serious failings in the transmission 
grid and the risk of wide-area blackouts. 
 
CEER has been monitoring quality of service at the EU level (see CEER, 2016). There does 
seem to be a general improvement in customer minutes lost over the period 2002-2014, based 
on data reported to them. Measuring this is not straightforward as it depends on how 
interruptions are monitored and reported (with different national definitions of what constitutes 
an interruption and different qualities of national reporting systems) and on exogenous drivers 
of interruption such as extreme weather events. 
 
Transmission system reliability also seems to have improved for several countries. One 
measure here is average transmission interruption (ATI) time. However, this is from very low 
levels to start with: Spain improved from 2.006 minutes in 2002 to 0.441 minutes in 2014 
(CEER, 2016, p.46). 
 
One quality issue is whether increased power flows between countries and system operator 
areas increases the risk of wider area blackout. This is because one system operator only has 
full visibility on the scheduling of generators and loads within its control area, while  
interconnectors in an alternating current (AC) power system are subject to unscheduled loop 
flows as power transacted between areas A and B, may actually travel via a third area (from A 
to C to B, without area C having sight of the transaction between A and B)37. This situation is 
especially difficult to manage if there is an unplanned transmission line outage which affects 
                                                 
34 Available at: http://fuelpoverty.eu/home/eu-inability-to-heat-home-map-031013-citation/ 
35 See Arnold et al. (2007). 
36 0.5 * 100 / 8760 = 0.5%. 
37 Bonnard (2003) reports the unplanned flows through Belgium on a day in 1999 when unidentified flows (to 
the Belgium system operator) increased from 600 MW to 2000 MW within four hours and were two thirds of all 
flows. This is because, for instance, some of power transacted between France and Germany will flow through 
Belgium. See ENTSO-E (2017a, p.20) for a map of the European transmission system.  
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flows through C.  This is examined in Bialek (2004) who reviews the 2003 blackouts which 
saw 6 wide area blackouts in 6 weeks affecting 112 million people, five of which were in 
Europe (the sixth covered a large part of the North East of the US, including New York City). 
These included a blackout involving large parts of Denmark/Sweden and the whole of Italy 
(which was the largest blackout in Europe since 1945). Bialek reviews the New York, 
Denmark/Sweden and Italy incidents and concludes that while increased cross-border trading 
did not directly cause the blackouts it did necessitate an upgrading of inter system operator 
communication, as in both the Italy case and the similar case in New York, outdated 
communications infrastructure contributed to the slow communication of evolving problems 
in one system which ultimately had serious consequences for interconnected systems. There 
have been other internationally power outage incidents, such as on the 4th November 2006 
incident when a power line in Northern Germany had to be switched off to let a ship pass 
underneath it and caused a blackout in several European countries (see UCTE, 2007). 
 
Europe has made significant efforts to improve inter TSO coordination to reduce these sorts of 
problems. The association of European TSOs (ENTSO-E) has overseen the establishment of 
regional security coordinators (RSCs), which are made up of groups of national TSOs (see 
ENTSO-E, 2017). These RSCs undertake regional operational security coordination, regional 
outage coordination, coordinated capacity calculation, capacity adequacy assessments and 
provide dynamic asset information. The largest of these RSCs is CORESO, which began in 
2008 and covers a population of 279m (which is a private joint venture of REE (Spain), Elia 
(Belgium), RTE (France), National Grid (UK), Terna (Italy), 50Hertz (Germany), and REN 
(Portugal)). These RSCs are designed to reduce the risks that lead to the international incidents 
in 2003 and 2006. 
 
Environmental impact 
 
The European electricity system has been going through a profound transition with respect to 
its environmental impact. Between 2004 and 2015, the share of electricity generation from 
renewable sources has doubled from 14.3% to 28.8%. Hydro-electricity has barely changed in 
absolute quantity over this period. The increase is almost entirely due to an increase in wind, 
solar, biofuels and other renewables (total generation has fallen by 1%).38 
 
The emissions intensity and energy efficiency of EU electricity has also improved 
significantly39. The carbon emissions intensity was 431g of CO2 / kWh in 1990, 371g / kWh 
in 1999 and 276g / kWh in 2014 (a decline of 36% between 1990 and 2014). The increased 
share of renewables and the increased use of more efficient gas fired power generation and 
reduced use of coal in electricity generation has contributed to average power plant efficiency 
increasing from 36% in 1990 to 44% in 201440. 
 
Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) noted impressive improvements in emissions of sulphur and nitrous 
oxides from the power sector in the period from 1990 up to 2003. Between 2004 and 2014, 
emissions have fallen by 77% of sulphur dioxide and 49% for nitrous oxides and 81% for 
dust41.  
 
                                                 
38 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares 
39 See https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/overview-of-the-electricity-production-2/assessment 
40 This is across all power plants where, for example, wind would be 100% efficient, nuclear around 33%. 
41 See https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/emissions-of-air-pollutants-from/assessment-1 
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The econometric evidence, presented in Asane-Otoo (2016) suggests that for individual 
countries CO2, NOX and SO2 intensity all decline with higher PMR over the period 1990-
2012. Other econometric evidence from Vona and Nicolli (2014) suggests that countries with 
greater amounts of liberalization in their electricity sector have higher penetration of wind and 
solar power. Two channels for these effects might be: first, greater reliance on market forces 
to guide generation investment resulted in faster coal to gas substitution in the EU (and across 
the non-Europe OECD); and, second, that the initial efficiency gains from liberalization 
(discussed in Pollitt, 2008) were partly spent on supporting renewables. What is certainly true 
is that a combination of market liberalization (which initially favoured gas over coal), carbon 
pricing (which also favours gas over coal), the Large Combustion Plant Directive42 (which 
forced higher emissions standards on existing and new coal fired power plants and raised their 
costs) and renewables support policies which have led to renewables increasingly reducing 
wholesale electricity prices (for both coal and gas fired power plants) have largely ended the 
building of new coal fired power plants in the EU (see Caldecott et al., 2017). 
 
Impact on innovation 
 
It is possible that over such a long period (1999-2018) the EU single market in electricity may 
have produced some positive short run effects which mask negative long run effects, i.e. static 
gains may be offset by dynamic losses. One channel for this might be the impact of 
liberalization on the quantity of investment in research and development, or indeed on the 
productivity of research and development. 
 
This is very difficult to measure because the rate of technological progress in electricity is slow 
and significantly affected by environmental regulation (and other types of regulation, such as 
nuclear safety)43. However Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) discuss how we would expect 
liberalization to reduce R+D expenditure by electricity companies in theory (e.g. due to 
reductions in size and incentives to invest in R+D), they then go on to show how this effect has 
played out in the UK (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011 and 2015) and evidence of similar effects across 
the world, notably in the US. 
 
One significant issue is the extent to which declines in electricity company R+D actually reduce 
aggregate energy R+D and the productivity of energy R+D expenditure. R+D may shift to the 
supply chain and away from former monopoly incumbent utilities. Marino et al. (2017) find 
that deregulation of electricity initially increases but then reduces electricity patents across 31 
OECD countries over the period 1985 to 2010. They conclude that this is evidence for an 
inverted-U relationship between strength of liberalization and patenting. The general 
equilibrium effect of the release of R+D resources to other sectors and the specific impact of 
higher expenditure on renewables linked to reform makes it very difficult to say what the 
aggregate dynamic effect of European electricity liberalization might be, even if aggregate 
energy R+D has declined. 
 
Overall assessments of the impact of the single electricity market 
 
It is striking in what we have discussed so far how little large scale evidence has been produced 
for the overall impacts of the single market in electricity. It is even more striking that the most 
                                                 
42 2001/80/EC. 
43 This is a phenomenon noted by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) for a range of industries in the US (including 
electricity) over the period 1973-1985. 
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convincing evidence is simulated. Simulation studies can show the benefits of market coupling 
and changing the pricing behavior of incumbent players. These studies find that reducing 
market power in pricing can have substantial benefits (e.g. Hobbs et al. (2005) who look at 
Netherlands-Belgium market coupling). A move from strategic interaction to perfect 
competition can be shown to yield big impacts, reducing the profits of incumbents significantly 
(Lise et al., 2006, show the profits of EdF and Tractabel falling by a third) if there was enough 
interconnection between countries. However, these theoretical gains from more perfect 
competition may not be realizable in a second best word. 
 
Moving to how actual overall reform effects can be assessed: there are a number of ways to 
assess the overall impact of liberalization package such as that represented by the single 
electricity market project (as noted in Pollitt, 2012). These include: performance metric 
regressions on panel data (e.g. Steiner, 2001); simple statistical tests of before and after 
performance using t-tests (e.g. following D’Souza and Megginson, 1999); social cost benefit 
analyses of reform (following Jones et al., 1990) with reform as public investment project; and 
macro studies of reform attempt to find impacts using general equilibrium models of the 
economy (e.g. Chisari et al., 1999 and Copenhagen Economics, 2005). Remarkably, not all of 
these methods have been applied clearly to the EU single market project, as opposed to 
electricity reform in the OECD more generally. Fiorio et al. (2007) attempts panel data 
regression on reform variables to show evidence of modest productivity improvements, but 
ambiguous price impacts for 15 EU countries.  
 
Reform evidence, both for samples of countries and specific case studies, seems to support the 
view (in Pollitt, 2012) that market liberalisation reduces costs somewhat but may not impact 
prices. This positive view on productivity has recently been disputed by Polemis and Stengos 
(2017), who suggest that for their sample of OECD countries over the period 1975-2013 
electricity liberalisation does not increase their measures of productivity (which include 
generation per capita and labour productivity) in already liberalised countries. However a 
standard problem with panel data analysis is that reform is a package and identification of its 
effects is a problem given that multiple significant policy impacts happen simultaneously (for 
instance cost increasing environmental policy and cost reducing market reform). 
 
What is more clear is that public dissatisfaction with liberalised energy markets in Europe 
remains strong. Fiorio and Florio (2011) showed that in Europe private ownership of electricity 
assets was correlated with increased public dissatisfaction with the industry. This 
dissatisfaction explains the remaining significant public ownership in European electricity, in 
spite of the single electricity market, and the fact that in at least half of EU countries residential 
price controls still exist for some household customers (something which ACER continues to 
condemn as limiting the impact of the single market project)44. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Reflecting on the development of the EU single market in electricity, it is difficult not to be 
impressed with it in terms of the structural changes since 1996. National markets that were 
once dominated by a single incumbent generator and a single incumbent retailer have been 
opened-up to competition. Independent regulation has been significantly increased, both at the 
national and at the level of the EU itself. There has been significant enforcement action by the 
                                                 
44 See, for example, ACER/CEER (2017, p.8) which discusses the impact of supplier of lost resort mechanisms 
which limit switching behaviour in the residential energy market. 
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European Commission’s competition authority (DG Competition) to promote further reform. 
Legislation has evolved through successor directives and a new directive is under discussion. 
In parallel there has been the development of power exchanges and market coupling, as well 
as the emergence of non-discriminatory access to the transmission system with robust legal 
and ownership unbundling of transmission and increased coordination between national system 
operators. The ownership of the industry has been reorganized, with large numbers of pan-
European mergers and acquisitions and the entry of gas incumbents into electricity. Cross 
border trading of electricity has increased. There has been a high degree of ‘regulatory 
convergence’ in electricity between member states, at a higher level than might have been 
imagined in the absence of the single market. At the same time the environmental agenda has 
been promoted with the introduction of a carbon market in 2005 and massive financial support 
for renewables which is bringing about a genuine ‘energy transition’. The electricity industry 
has been transformed, especially for countries with less favourable initial attitudes to 
competition in electricity. 
 
However, while the level of structural and institutional change is impressive, the quantification 
of the costs and benefits of the single market is extremely hard and the evidence we do have 
suggests that the overall gains in terms of price, cost and quality of service impacts are modest, 
especially if we consider the 25-year time frame. 
 
The difficulty of doing econometrically robust analysis of actual data on the single electricity 
market is high. This is not helped by the multiple reform elements (horizontal and vertical 
unbundling, wholesale market developments and privatization) happening at more or less the 
same time. Add in the cost increasing effect of renewables support and underlying fluctuations 
in wholesale gas, coal and carbon prices. Furthermore, the EU itself is not the same: it had 15 
members in 1996, but this had expanded to 28 by 2013. Any single market study suffers from 
a lack of compatible data, combined with multiple confounding factors and highly partial 
analysis of a narrow range of impacts.45 Putting different econometric studies together to gain 
an overall picture involves comparing studies conducted over different numbers of countries 
and different time periods. Some of the best studies on single market-type impacts don't look 
at just the EU, but often the wider OECD. 
 
What one can say, is that the ‘proven’ overall impacts on welfare would seem to be small. The 
evidence seems to be of some small productivity improvement, some wholesale price 
convergence and limited (if any) retail price reductions. The studies on which the European 
Commission relies (notably Copenhagen Economics, 2005, and Booz & Company, 2013) 
significantly rely on simulation of future impacts and give rather limited attention to actual 
data. Given that the measured overall impacts would seem to be small, this suggests the need 
for rather more careful attention to measuring impacts than most current studies are capable of. 
Indeed, in line with Pollitt (2012), it suggests little substitute for detailed cost benefit analysis 
of individual European country case studies of reform. 
 
In fairness to the European Commission as architects of the single electricity market, it is 
important to say that the Commission does continually emphasize the fact that the single 
electricity market remains a work in progress.46 The Commission together with its sector 
                                                 
45 One referee of this paper asked me to think about putting in some tables and figures. However even the 
simplest comparative figure, such as electricity prices in the US and the EU over the last 25 years is not actually 
available on an internally consistent basis, because the data on the EU-28 only starts from 2004. 
46 See for example European Commission (2017, p.1-2). 
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regulatory organisations - ACER and the CEER - stress that more needs to be done. The fourth 
energy package is a commitment to doing more. Indeed, one of the genuinely good reasons the 
Commission may not have emphasized studies of past gains from the process is precisely to 
keep the focus on what needs to be done in the future. However, that is not to say that the 
documentation of single market gains (and losses) is unimportant. Simulation studies can 
always show potential gains from extending markets towards a first best world, but we all live 
in the here and now, in the second best. 
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